Barack Obama came into office having promised to distance America from the neoconservative philosophy that dominated George W. Bush's presidency. As a senator, he had opposed the Iraq war, and during his presidential campaigning he vowed to negotiate peace between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as extend an open hand to the Iranian regime. But as his first term draws to a close, Professor Fawaz Gerges, director of the London School of Economics' Middle East Centre, argues Obama has been timid when it comes to the region, and as a consequence his policies have been disastrous.
Following Bush's "war on terror", the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Turkey's growing dominance, as well as Iran's increasing influence in Iraq, America's hard-power domination in the region, is according to Gerges - coming to an end. Whilst the decline of American hegemony is an interesting discussion, it does however feel at times superfluous to Gerges' gravamen and contradicts the subtitle of the book, as he shows America's relationship with the Middle East certainly amounts to more than just a "moment".
Throughout Gerges vituperatively attacks Bush's foreign policy, dismissing it as a "faith based agenda". He bizarrely blames Bush for the election of Hamas in Gaza - seemingly failing to comprehend it was the Palestinians themselves who democratically elected such a government. And he conveniently neglects the fact Bush was the first American President to call for the recognition of a Palestinian state. We are told Bush's foreign policy advisers were the "fierce Israel-first school"; individuals who "displayed a curious inability to view the Middle East through anything but Israeli-made glasses". This is an accusation later made at Obama's staff, many of whom are old faces from the Clinton era. Indeed, Obama's former aide Dennis Ross, who has a "long history of representing Israel-first special-interest groups within and beyond the US administrations", is the target of much of Gerges' ire.
During his Presidential campaign in 2006, Obama stressed his foreign policy philosophy as something "based on a realistic assessment of the sobering facts on the ground and our interests in the region". Early on in his Presidency, he extended his hand to the Muslim world, declaring in Cairo, June 2009 that he was seeking "a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect".
In the speech Obama discussed the Israel-Palestine conflict. It is worth quoting him at length:
"For more than 60 years they've (Palestinians) endured the pain of dislocation. Many wait in refugee camps in the West Bank, and neighbouring lands for a life of peace and security that they have never been able to lead. They endure daily humiliations - large and small-that come with occupation. So let there be no doubt: the situation for the Palestinian people is intolerable. And America will not turn our backs on the legitimate Palestinian aspiration for dignity, opportunity, and a state of their own".
Gerges claims Obama has not acted upon this rhetoric for fear of upsetting "the pro-Israel lobby". His peace summit met a fate not dissimilar to Bush's efforts at Annapolis in 2007, and he later dismissed the Palestinians bid for self-determination at the UN. This, Gerges contends will be remembered as Obama's "missed opportunity". In the end he could not even curtail the Hawkish Netanyahu's desire for settlement expansion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the Palestinians were conveniently dropped.
In his discussion on the Israel-Palestine conflict, Gerges accepts contentious statements from Abdel Bari Atwan and Khaled Meshaal on face value. Yet both men have been known to make contradictory statements to placate different audiences. It is thus apparent Professor Gerges is somewhat tendentious in his handling of certain sources.
This is also the case regarding his discussion on Iran's nuclear program. He narrates the work of controversial columnist Seymour Hersh, who "has been reporting on Iran and the bomb for The New Yorker for the past decade", and has "concluded that there is no new incriminating evidence in the report (IAEA's)". This deduction is based "on several interviews with top nuclear engineers and arms control specialists and former US intelligence officials who have spent years researching the Iranian nuclear program". Indeed, "Hersh asserts that the recent charges against Iran are politically motivated and that the new director General of the IAEA, Yukiya Amano...is acting at the behest of US wishes".
Whilst it is known Mr Hersh is not the most reliable of sources and that much of his reporting his somewhat dubious, Gerges does not seem to pass judgement on his source (in what is otherwise a heavily polemical and opinionated book). Yet in the conclusion, Gerges seems to drop the incertitude he creates surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions, claiming "the Iranians have recently doubled their efforts to amass more low-enriched uranium and begun enrichment at a facility deep underground". It would therefore appear his use of Mr Hersh's work is simply an exercise in obscurantism.
From the outset of his Presidency, Obama repaired America's relationship with Turkey following Bush's "poor stewardship of the US-Turkey relationship". Gerges claims Obama's "greatest political achievement.... Lay in nourishing an exceptionally close strategic relationship with Turkey". But such a claim contradicts his previous claims about the Israel lobby. He does not explain how Obama was able to build close ties with Turkey, despite its decline in bilateral ties with Israel. Indeed, if the Jewish state really did wag America's tail as Gerges suggests - how did Obama forge this relationship?
According to Gerges, "Al Qaeda no longer exists as an effective organisation", and he contends fear of Al-Qaeda is the West's imagination. Referencing an article by New York Times Correspondents David Sanger and Mark Mazzetti, he argues "there are roughly only 300 (now fewer than 100) surviving members of Al Qaeda, based mainly in Pakistan and Afghanistan". In the same article however, the authors mention that many American officials warn "Al Qaeda has forged close ties with a number of affiliated militant groups", and thus such statistics should not be taken seriously - something Gerges fails to mention.
He also makes the creepy claim that "Al Qaeda and other similar factions might succeed in carrying out an attack in the not too distant future based on the escalation of conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan". Yet he fails to acknowledge that Al Qaeda was operating in both countries before American intervention. Nor does he address the inspiration behind why Al Qaeda and their surrogates continue to foment civil war in Nigeria, as well as demand East Timor is returned to Indonesia.
Whilst Iraq may not be the beacon of democracy the neoconservatives had predicted, Obama has nonetheless managed to withdraw American troops. They are also continuing to leave Afghanistan, until complete withdrawal in 2014. Thus Gerges' criticisms regarding these two countries seem somewhat unfair. As does his criticisms regarding Obama's handling of Egypt. He may have been slow in dealing with Egypt's revolution having been taken by surprise. But when it became apparent Mubarak's time was up, Obama rightly cut his former ally loose.
Acutely aware of America's declining hegemony, Obama stated in the opening of The 2010 National Security Strategy, that he is "focused on renewing American leadership so that we can more effectively advance our interests in the 21st century". Whilst Gerges claims Obama's approach in the Middle East "reflects a vacuum in global leadership", he fails to recognise the inevitably Islamic revolution across the region is not in anyone's interest, least of all America's, and thus Obama's realist foreign policy which he was elected on, has seemingly not altered.
So as the storm continues to gather in the Middle East; the jury remains, for now, still out on President Obama.