I was most frustrated not to be able to participate in the debate on HS2 last Thursday, so I have made the effort to convert my thoughts into a blog post that covers the aspects of my speech which covered issues I felt others did not cover sufficiently.
First and foremost, we have to recognise that £32 billion is a lot of money, but that it 'only' amounts to £1-2 billion per year between now and 2032. That is not to diminish the scale of the spending, but I do feel that bandying about a sum that will be spent over the length of twenty years creates a slightly misleading impression. Equally, no-one wants to create white elephants either - and the task of politicians is to ensure that the right line is built if it is determined that a new line is needed. We must also recognise this country's 60-year infrastructure lag that has to be overcome somehow.
For that, I think, is the crux of the matter. What disappointed me was that the those both strongly for and strongly against still struggle to find any common ground, or any recognition that there needs to be a consensus. Merely expecting the Government to abandon HS2 is unrealistic, and does nothing to solve the wider strategic problems. Equally, arguing that it should be full steam ahead anyone with concerns is not paying attention, is equally unhelpful.
The strategic problems resolve principally around capacity. I admire all those who manage to find empty trains on the West Coast Main Line. As a regular traveller, I must always be picking the busiest ones. Both Rail Package 2 and RP2+, which anti-HS2 groups are promoting, do increase peak-time capacity by some 70 per cent. RP2 is occurring whatever the decision on HS2, as I understand it, though RP2+ would require additional work again. We need to realise how traumatic the last upgrade of the West Coast Main Line was, and factor that disruption into our assessments. Additionally, the peak-hour increases, whilst welcome, are only a sticking plaster. It is unavoidably the case that a HS2 line, under the Government's proposals, would increase capacity by some 150 per cent. This is an order of magnitude that I believe cannot be ignored.
The only grounds for ignoring it is if you question the whole assumption that demand will continue to increase. However, DfT projections are a cautious two per cent per annum, when since 2008, it has been 10 per cent per annum on the WCML according to briefings I have received.
Proponents of the scheme also need to be less bullish about the potential economic impact. No single piece of infrastructure has ever transformed a regional economy, and this one will not abolish the North/South divide. The word 'transformative' is so over-used, it should be banned. What is required is for city regions and local transport partnerships to ensure they take the decisions that fall within their remit in such policy areas as local transport and skills to ensure that the potential the new line could bring is fully exploited.
It would be far better in my view for both sides to seek consensus on changes that can be made to the route south of Birmingham whilst retaining as much of the additional capacity a new line will bring as possible. We have what is essentially the gold-plated option currently, and there seems little willingness on the part of the Government to water it down. Options such as following existing road and rail routes as far as possible should be considered. Intermediate stations could provide regional commuter benefits, and can even be done without slowing other trains down by inserting passing loops. Connectivity at Birmingham could be improved, and I am not sure the Government has yet fully addressed the Mayor of London's concerns about dispersal of passengers at Euston.
Much of this was contained in the Party's pre-election Heathrow Hub policy. Whilst I am glad we substituted the misguided S-route for the Y-route, I am nonetheless at a loss as to why Heathrow Hub was ditched in favour of the gold-plated 'Golden Arrow' through the Chilterns. Heathrow Hub followed existing transport corridors such as the M40 and the Chiltern Line.
It is worth noting also that Lord Mawhinney's report into whether Heathrow should be on the high-speed network only found against the idea when assessing it on the basis of it ceasing at Birmingham: "... a direct high speed link to Heathrow fully funded from public expenditure, in the context of a high speed rail network extending only to the Midlands, is not likely to provide a good return on the public expenditure entailed."
Yet most major European airports are connected directly to their high-speed networks. Indeed, Schiphol is the major rail hub for all the Netherlands, rather than Amsterdam Centraal. And the Dutch experience also demonstrates that high-speed rail doesn't work well 'only' in geographically large countries.
Our trip to Europe as a Select Committee was enlightening in that it demonstrated we already have a superior high-speed network in this country which we perhaps fail to appreciate. Travelling from Paris to Frankfurt saw us speed along - initially - at 300 kph. Then we hit the end of the high-speed line and trundled the remainder of the way at a speed less than I experience at times on my morning commute on the Kingston Loop.
The visit also demonstrated how the politicisation of decisions about the networks was considered normal in Europe, and nothing to be ashamed of. France had stations in proverbial 'turnip' fields to gain local support. Even the Frankfurt-Cologne line had intermediate stops at Montabaur and Limburg Sued inserted at the time by Helmut Kohl to satisfy his local CDU colleagues.
Germany has focused in particular on addressing bottlenecks and utilising existing transport corridors rather than building lines straight as a die. It was also striking how often we heard the word 'polycentric' to describe Germany, compared to our London-centric UK. Whilst no single project can change that, it does emphasise a long-term problem for the UK in my view.
My advice to the Government is to seek greater consensus by introducing greater flexibility south of Birmingham. Do not repeat mistakes when setting the criteria for the Y-route of being both gold-plated and inflexible, and try to use existing corridors such as the M40 or Chiltern Line. Do not dismiss the need for consideration of economic development in the North - it is not a case of economic interference and planning so much as localism to ensure the benefits that could accrue do occur.
This is a historic opportunity, the type which this country too often foregoes through lack of self-confidence. If there is one thing I do not want to see, it is this House debating the issue of inter-city capacity in 10 years time because we averted our eyes from the strategic challenge now.