The revolution that overthrew and killed Mu'ammar al-Gaddafi, the 'Brother-Leader' who ruled Libya for 42 years, celebrated its anniversary a short while ago. Throughout the military conflict that rocked the oil-rich country western media presented an image of a unified and purposeful Libyan opposition. Yet, less than five months since Gaddafi was beaten to death by a lynch mob in his hometown of Sirte, the country is ridden by factionalism, tribalism, Islamism, and appears to be heading towards a divided future.
So, what happened to the unity? Well, arguably Libyans were only really unified in their opposition to and distaste for Qadhafi and the political system he had imposed on the country for four decades. Underneath the surface of a modernising, secular society with considerable oil wealth, old loyalties of tribe and region were still looming. With the linchpin at the top gone, a Pandora's Box has been opened.
Tribalism, or more accurately neo-tribalism, is a serious problem in post-revolutionary Libya. Although tribes as a socio-economic unit are definitely a thing of the past, tribal identity (or perhaps ideology) continues to be important. Despite the fact that most Libyans live modern lives in cities along the Mediterranean coast these days, many are relatively recent migrants from the countryside. As such they continue to value tribal identity. When confronted with significant political problems many urbanised, modern Libyans will still side with their tribe or family rather than with political parties.
In his effort to divide and rule, Gaddafi utilised this phenomenon to sow dissension amongst the population. Building an intricate web of patron-client relations, Gaddafi made sure to ally with key tribal leaders. Through co-optation and accommodation he made sure that he effectively undermined any oppositional threat from these groups. For over four decades the strategy worked.
But, by doing so, Gaddafi also reinforced tribal identity and regionalism at a time in history when tribes were becoming insignificant from a socio-economic perspective. Thus, modern tribalism in Libya is not the same as tribalism in the pre-modern period when tribes were operating from semi-autonomous platforms and were cohesive socio-economic units. Rather, tribalism represents an alternative political outlook informed by certain ideas of a historical belonging.
As such, manipulation of tribal identities for political purposes can be highly effective. This was clearly seen in the recent conflict. Although the initial revolt against Gaddafi was not based on tribalism, the ensuing war against the regime which was won with considerable NATO assistance did indeed feature tribal mobilisation of irregular fighters. The National Transitional Council (NTC) also used Gaddafi's own neo-tribal methods and co-opted members of Gaddafi's own tribe to the side of the revolution. This undoubtedly carried important symbolism as it undermined Gaddafi's tribal credentials.
Another important feature of the revolution has been the emergence of various Islamist groups. Like in Egypt and Tunisia, the fall of secular authoritarianism has allowed the Islamists to come out in the open. As in Egypt, the best organised of these groups is the Muslim Brothers but there are also various Salafist currents and other groupings. The leader of the Islamic Movement for Change (IMC) is the well-known radical Abdel Hakim Belhaj, who is currently suing the British government for alleged involvement in his capture and rendition to Libya where he claims he was tortured.
In the eastern part of the country, what was once called Cyrenaica, regionalism has re-surfaced following the fall of Gaddafi. In October last year a conference with delegates from the Eastern Province of al-Barqah/Cyrenaica called for more regional input into the way the country was run and rejected the return to a centralised administration. On 6 March this year another gathering of tribal and militia leaders went further and demanded autonomy and federalism. Tensions between these regional forces and the Islamists are very noticeable in this part of the country. This was particularly evident during the war when Islamists killed and mutilated the body of Brigadier General Abdel Fattah Younes, who had defected from Qadhafi's military to head the revolutionary army.
Other expressions of regionalism have been seen in calls to make Benghazi the new capital of Libya because of its prominent role in the revolution and its staunch opposition to Gaddafi during his long rule. There have also been demands from the citizens of Misrata, who suffered heavily during the war, that it should have a large share of government posts or even the position of Prime Minister in the new Libya. In the Western Mountain region conflict between the Amazigh minority and the local Arab population has come to the surface recently, while in Tripoli itself the number of armed militia groups is increasing alarmingly. Meanwhile, thousands of people who were taken as political prisoners during the fighting are still behind bars.
So, it seems getting rid of Gaddafi was the easy part. Building a democratic Libya based on the rule of law and where everyone is pulling in the same direction is clearly going to be much trickier.