As the rebel leaders celebrate in Tripoli, what seems almost certain is the end of Colonel Gaddafi's 42 year reign as "Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution". Although the victory of the rebels hasn't exactly been swift, following NATO intervention, the balance of power shifted decidedly in their favour and the eventual demise of the Gaddafi regime has been assumed as a certainty by most key policy makers for some time now.
What's perhaps more interesting is the future direction of Libya and much now depends on how coherent a movement the rebels actually are. It's very easy to interpret recent events as a battle between the forces of tyranny and the forces of freedom... a story reflected very much in the recent rhetoric of political leaders in the UK, France and the US, ostensibly committed to helping Libyans overthrow a leader who has "denied his people freedom, exploited their wealth, murdered opponents at home and abroad, and terrorised innocent people around the world" (Obama) and to "take control of their own destiny" (Cameron). If this sounds familiar it's because it was the kind of story told initially about Iraq. However, the situation in Libya, just like in Iraq and Afghanistan, is likely to be a much more complex picture than this romantic, but ultimately one-dimensional narrative suggests.
The extended period of time it took the rebels to reach Tripoli, even with a high level of air support from NATO, and the ongoing struggle to attain full control of the city perhaps raises questions as to whether the rebels actually enjoy overwhelming support in Libya and whether a significant section of the population still remains at least sympathetic to the Gaddafi regime. There will be a wide variety of different personal political and economic agendas at stake for those both inside and outside the old regime. These might range from large-scale interests related to Libya's substantial energy resources, to more localised concerns about power and control in specific neighbourhoods. Whether these interests can be reconciled with a democratic and stable Libya in the longer term is yet to be seen.
The National Transitional Council, aided by the high level of international support they are likely to receive from the West and regional actors, should be able to form a government. It's likely that, through state-building assistance programmes, the foreign powers that have supported the rebels will come to have a significant influence in how the post-Gaddafi Libyan state is shaped. The question is perhaps how sustainable, democratic and free from external interference this government will be.
The demise of the Gaddafi regime does have the potential to radically improve influence on the lives and human rights situation of the Libyan people. At the same time, let's not forget the extremely difficult human rights situation in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The violence and instability after the invasion killed 100,000-110,000 people, with the situation at its worst in 2006, a full three years after toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime.
Libya is, of course, a different context and one would hope that lessons have been learned since then. There is no foreign occupying force as there was in Iraq and, while the rebels have had external support, the regime change is home-grown. Insurgency and resistance to the new government may therefore be reduced.
However, the variety of different political and economic agendas which are likely to be at stake, combined with high levels of small arms ownership could create a fertile environment for future instability and insurgency. It will be very important for any new government to manage competing interests and expectations across Libya and not simply to serve their own interests or those of their immediate supporters.
In Iraq, the rather myopic belief, held by Coalition leaders, that it was enough simply to liberate the oppressed population from tyranny, led them to ignore crucial political, social and economic issues in the management of post-Saddam Iraq. Hopefully, the Libyan rebels and their international partners won't make the same mistakes.